Call for Papers

The time that has passed since the colonial war, or liberation wars, and the consequent sedimentation of the inevitability of independence - a period which is becoming more and more distant — helps to relativise feelings and remove the pamphleteering nature of many opinions and judgements that have been made, sometimes without foundation, about the situation and the possibilities for the Portuguese military to act in the territories that were still colonised, before and after 25 April 1974.

Between essays, monographs and memoirs, a lot has already been written about the colonial war, or liberation wars, and the process of decolonisation. Of course, many issues can and should still be discussed — to paraphrase Valentim Alexandre, there could be no exemplary decolonisation because this would be premised on exemplary colonisation —, but it is important to reflect more deeply and fairly on the actions of the military throughout these various wars. The military was conditioned in its notions of authority and mission, as well as in its operationality, both by the international situation and by the repercussions of new political paradigms that were spreading among officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers. Take, for example, the intermittency of the fighting, the diversity of the terrain, the reactions of the population, the multiplicity of opponents and their tactics and weaponry. Regardless of the feeling of imperative fulfilment of duty, would inevitably emerge the perception that the belligerence was dragging on to a pointless end.

As was the case before, every day that passed since the 25th of April would weigh heavily on the judgment that military actions made no political sense. Amid changes in the chain of command and operations, military personnel of different ranks and responsibilities moved in various (and in some cases unusual) directions, guided by different motivations, decisions and strategies, even to the extent that this was politically and militarily possible. While some tried to gain time until Lisbon's political decision on the independence of the colonies, others felt obliged to act almost disruptively to speed up this decision, forcing the hand of the metropolitan decision-makers. Predictably, the armed actions coexisted with informal meetings and truce agreements with the guerrilla forces of the movements.

Nevertheless, in some cases, the military had to deal with the upsurge in armed actions by the liberation movements in the months following 25 April. In effect, the Portuguese military was subjected to armed actions that targeted them as a force of the coloniser - with the circumstantial justification that the intention was to democratise Portugal and continue colonisation - and sought to gain the best position to guarantee access to power after independence, to the detriment of other movements or mere fellow citizens.

If the war had already proved to be a heavy burden, after 25 April the situation was no less challenging: the military's actions varied, from disinterest in armed action to mobilisation, to contain restorationist attempts, or to unsuccessfully impose peace, which, for example, was not achieved in the turmoil in Angola.

Under pressure from the outbreak and spread of racial conflicts and then violent clashes, under what conditions was it possible to maintain a minimum level of cohesion? How were command and operational capacity maintained, or eroded, in the clash between the desire to return "safe and sound" and adherence to nation-building projects in the new territories, among other motivations?

The military acted in different of ways: unexpected surrenders, offensive actions, negotiations to establish ceasefire and peace agreements, joint action with forces from the movements (or from one of the factions), support for the movements, not forgetting retaliatory actions for the arrest of Portuguese soldiers.

The International Colloquium "From the Wars to Post-25 April: The Military in Territories in Upheaval" will analyse the role of the Portuguese armed forces and their adversaries from the time of the conflicts to the period of transition to independence (Guinea, Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe, Angola, Mozambique, and Timor).

Given the evolution in some territories towards an increased internationalisation of their different conflicts, the Colloquium will also welcome contributions that propose to analyse the entry onto the scene of new military actors (e.g. Cuba, South Africa) and the interactions maintained with Portuguese military personnel.

Working languages 

• Portuguese, Spanish, French and English

Thematic axes 

• The course of wars and the management of political perceptions among the military 
• Actions in the governance of overseas territories 
• Political perceptions in the military and cohesion in the field 
• Political and ideological affiliations and working with civilians 
• The specificities of the decolonisation processes in the various territories 
• The condition of loyalist troops 
• Locally incorporated elements: trajectories from pre to post-25 April 
• Interactions between the Portuguese military and foreign military corps

Communication proposals, in DOCX, between 180 and 200 words, should be sent to guerra25abril@letras.ulisboa.pt by 15 January 2025. Proposals must be accompanied by a 100-word biographical note.